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1. Introduction 
In this paper we examine how trade liberalisation affects welfare when firms are 
engaging in R&D investment.  Trade liberalisation can be expected to intensify the 
competition that firms face.  Does more competition encourage innovation? On the one 
hand, there is the Schumpeterian tradition (Schumpeter (1934, 1942)) emphasizing that 
monopoly rents give incentives for innovation. On the other hand, there is the view that 
competition puts pressure on firms to innovate so as not to fall behind. There have been 
many theoretical papers on the topic, both from a general equilibrium growth theory and 
from a partial equilibrium IO perspective. Despite the voluminous literature, there does 
not appear to be a theoretical consensus in the “competition and innovation” debate.1  
However, when it comes to trade liberalisation, there is a greater consensus among 
authors on the benefits for innovation of trade liberalisation. Many empirical studies 
suggest that the typical firm improves its productivity performance in response to lower 
trade costs.2  
 
In this paper, international oligopolists choose process R&D.  The firms set their R&D in 
a strategic environment and use it to improve their own profitability in two ways. They 
do so directly, through a reduction in production costs, and indirectly (strategically) 
through the effect on their rivals’ output. We derive the comparative-static effects of 
trade liberalisation on outputs, exports, R&D levels, profits and welfare.  We show how 
strategic investment has important implications for the welfare effects of trade 
liberalisation. 
 
                                                 
1 Some highlights in this debate include: Arrow (1962), who concluded that a firm in a competitive industry 
has a greater incentive to innovate than a monopoly; Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), who showed that 
competition can lead to redundant R&D investment; Aghion et al. (2005), who found an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between increased competition and innovation; Gilbert (2006), who  provides a useful survey 
of recent state of  the competition and  innovation debate. 
2 See, for instance, Krishna and Mitra (1998), Pavcnik (2002), Amiti and Konings (2007) and Fernandes 
(2007)). Trefler (2004), by contrast, finds a reduction in domestic tariffs has no significant impact on firm 
level productivity. Ederington and McCalman (2007) looking at the Colombian experience with trade 
liberalisation. They found it tended to raise the productivity of the typical firm in industries with low 
barriers to entry, small technology gaps, large markets and also large initial levels of protection. 
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We build on the reciprocal markets (RM) model of trade liberalisation first developed by 
Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983).  They used the RM model to consider 
multilateral trade liberalisation between two identical countries, with firms competing in 
a Cournot manner.  They demonstrated that intra-industry trade can occur in equilibrium 
even when goods are identical and that welfare is U-shaped in transport costs. There is 
no investment in their model.  
 
Unlike in the original RM model, our model allows for firms to make a prior investment 
in R&D that works to reduce marginal production costs.  Hence, when competing, firms 
choose their investment strategically. In modelling R&D investment, we follow the 
standard approach in models of strategic investment, pioneered by d’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988), but, unlike the latter, we do so in an open-economy set-up. 
 
The work most resembling ours is probably that of Van Long, Raff and Stähler (2008). 
They combine the RM trade liberalisation model with a model of R&D setting firms that 
is an extension of the Melitz (2003) heterogeneous firms model.  But, unlike in our model 
and that of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), firms do not choose R&D to manipulate 
rivals in their model. This turns out to matter significantly for the question whether it is 
possible that trade, no matter how limited, always yields higher welfare than autarky. Our 
model allows us to find conditions under which any trade is better than no trade.  The 
reason for this lies in the fact that, in our model, firms choose investment before outputs 
with the intention to strategically manipulate their rivals’ behaviour.  We show that, 
although strategic behaviour is mutually harmful to firms, it benefits innovation and 
consumers and is welfare improving in an overall sense. 
 
Clearly, if trade costs are sufficiently high, then just as in the reciprocal markets model 
without investment no trade can occur and the firms are monopolists in their own 
markets.  However, unlike in the original RM model, multilateral trade liberalisation will 
not necessarily result in a unique equilibrium.  We find that, in the case of symmetric 
multilateral trade liberalisation, as trade costs are lowered enough, we pass through a 
region of trade costs in which there are two stable equilibria. In one of these, there is 
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intra-industry trade and at the other, there is no trade.  Further liberalisation leads to a 
disappearance of the no trade equilibrium. We find that such symmetric multilateral trade 
liberalisation increases R&D-spending and firm productivity for all trade costs at which 
trade actually occurs and always benefits consumers.  However, it lowers profits at high 
trade costs but increases them at low trade costs. Nevertheless, firms are always worse off 
in trading equilibria than under autarky.  The U-shaped effect of trade liberalisation on 
social welfare, found in the standard RM model, persists.  However, unlike in the RM 
model, it is not necessarily true that limited trade liberalisation lowers welfare below the 
autarky welfare level.  In fact, we show that, if R&D is sufficiently effective in lowering 
costs, trade always yields higher welfare than autarky. 
 
In section 2, we develop a RM model with R&D investment.  We first discuss firms’ 
optimal output decisions and then derive firms’ best response functions in R&D. In 
section 3, we discuss the effects of multilateral trade liberalisation on R&D, consumer 
surplus, profits and overall welfare.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The model  
Consider two countries, “Home” and “Foreign”. There are two firms labelled 1 and 2.  
Firm 1 produces and invests in Home, and is fully owned by Home residents while firm 2 
produces and invests in Foreign and is Foreign owned.  Firms are identical in all other 
respects.  The Home and the Foreign market are segmented.3  If firms want to sell in their 
rival’s domestic market, they export and face the same per unit trade cost, t .  Note that t  
is not a tariff.  Instead, one can interpret the trade cost as a non-tariff barrier or a transport 
cost.4  Demand in Home and Foreign is given by: 
Qap             (1a) 
and 
** Qap  ,          (1b) 
                                                 
3 This is a key assumption in RM type models and implies no resale between markets so that, in principal, 
market prices could differ. 
4 This has implications for the welfare functions.  Like in the original RM model, there will not be any 
tariff revenues to be returned to consumers.  Including tariff revenues would actually strengthen the gains 
from trade liberalisation. 
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respectively, with  and ;  refers to output by firm i ( ) 
intended for sale in Home and  refers to output intended for Foreign.  Note that 
variables referring to the Foreign market are starred. 
21 qqQ 
*
2
*
1
* qqQ 
*
i
iq 2,1  i
q
 
Each firm undertakes R&D, the costs of which are represented by .  Marginal 
production costs are denoted by .  Hence, firm 1’s and firm 2’s profits are given by: 
ik
ic
1
*
1
*
111
*
1
*
11 )( ktqqqcqppq        (2a) 
and 
22
*
222
*
2
*
22 )( ktqqqcqppq        (2b), 
respectively. 
 
A firm’s R&D affects its marginal production costs.  Let ii xcc  , where  represents 
the reduction in marginal production cost generated by the R&D firm i has undertaken.  
Henceforth, we will refer to  as the level of innovation by firm i. We define 
, where 
ix
ix
2/2ii xk    is the effectiveness of R&D.  Note that investment reduces 
marginal production cost at a diminishing rate.  This is both for reasons of plausibility 
and to ensure an interior solution.  
 
Firms play a two-stage game, in which they simultaneously choose R&D in the first stage 
and subsequently choose outputs for each market in the second stage.  Hence, output 
levels will depend on R&D levels. 
 
2.1. Output 
When both firms are active in both markets, each firm maximises its profits in each 
market given rival output.  At this stage, R&D levels are given.  Firm 1 and firm 2’s 
respective outputs for the “Home” country are: 
)2)(3/1( 211 xxtAq          (3a) 
and 
)22)(3/1( 122 xxtAq  ,       (3b) 
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while they produce: 
)22)(3/1( 21
*
1 xxtAq          (4a) 
and 
)2)(3/1( 12
*
2 xxtAq          (4b) 
for the “Foreign” country, respectively.  We have defined caA   for convenience. 
 
For a given  and for , it is clear from expressions (3a)-(4b) that each firm has 
a larger market share in its domestic market than in the export market.  Furthermore, 
exports are decreasing in t .  It is obvious that, at sufficiently high trade cost, trade ceases 
( 0 ) and firms are in autarky.  Each firm is then a monopolist in its domestic 
market, with outputs given by: 
0t 21 xx 
*
12  qq
))(2/1( 11 xAq           (5a) 
))(2/1( 2
*
2 xAq           (5b) 
 
2.2.  Innovation reaction functions  
In this subsection, we derive the innovation reaction functions.  Since innovation, , is 
monotonically increasing in R&D, , one can think of the firms as directly choosing 
their level of innovation (or marginal production cost reduction), .  This simplifies the 
algebraic derivations somewhat.  Given that we assume firms to be symmetric, firm 2’s 
reaction function is the mirror image of firm 1’s.  So, without loss of generality, we will 
adopt the perspective of firm one.   
ix
ik
ix
 
As a preliminary, note that expressions (3a)-(4b) indicate that, given sufficiently low  
and sufficiently high  (
ix
jx ij 
iq
) and high enough t , it is possible that even when output 
for the domestic market  is positive, the firm is not able to export.  Firms only export 
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when the non-negativity constraints on exports, and  are not violated. When 
the non-negativity constraint on  is just binding, it implies: 
02 q
x
2q
0*1 q
2
2q
022 12  xxtA          (6a) 
When the non-negativity constraint on  is just binding, we have: *1q
022 21  xxtA          (6b) 
Figure 1 depicts these non-negativity constraints in ( )-space for .  Below 
the locus , the non-negativity constraint on   is binding.  Also, above the locus 
, the non-negativity constraint on   is binding.  The two non-negativity 
constraints on exports divide the ( )-space up in four areas.  In area 1, autarky 
prevails, since .  In area 4, neither non-negativity constraint is binding, 
implying that two-way trade will prevail.  In areas 2 and 3, we have one-way trade (only 
firm 2 exports in area 2 ( ), whereas only firm 1 exports in area 3 ( )). 
1 , x 2/At 
02 q
02 q
q
0*1 q
*
1q
21 , xx
02
*
1  q
*
1q 0
 
Bearing this in mind, let us first consider firm 1’s best-response -level when there is 
two-way trade, that is, when both firms export to each other’s domestic market.   We 
denote this best-response function by .   Firm 1 then maximises profits given , 
implying:   
1x
)( 21 xR
ee
2x
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2 
/1
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2
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
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
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      (7) 
with ,  / *1111 xqqx  11 q2/ q  ,  and 
  from expressions (3a)-(4b); note that 
 from the final stage.  Firm i’s best response function is then 
given by: 
*
1
*
21 / qq 
3/1/ 1
*
2  dxdq
0/ *11  q
/ 12 dxdq
/ 11  q
)9/16(1
)9/8()2)(9/4(
)( 21 


tA
xRee 2
x
       (8) 
 
We now turn to the best-response function of firm 1 when there is only one-way trade.  
We first derive the optimal -level when firm 1 does not export ( ) and faces 1x 0
*
1 q
 6
competition in its domestic market from firm 2 (  and  are given by expressions (3a) 
and (3b), respectively, while  is given by (5b)) and denote this best-response function 
by .  The first-order condition for  is then: 
1q 2q
*
2q
)( 2
0
1 xR
e
1x
0
1
2
2
1 



dx
dq
qdx
d 
1
1
1
1



x

        (9)  
with  // 1111 xqx  , 2q 1q ,  and 3/1/21 /  1dxdq  .  Hence, firm 1’s best 
response function is given by: 
)9/8(1
))[(9/4(
)( 22
0
1 


xtA
xR e 
]
1
       (10)  
Now we derive the optimal -level when firm 1 exports to and competes in Foreign with 
firm 2, but does not face any competition from firm 2 in its domestic market ( ,  
and  are given by expressions (4a) and (4b), respectively, while  is given by (5a)); 
denote this best-response function by .  The first-order condition for  is then: 
x
02 q
1x
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2q 1q
0
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e )( 2x
0
1
*
2
*
2
1
1
1
1
1 






dx
dq
qxdx
d 
        (11) 
with , ,  and .  Now, the best 
response for firm 1 is: 
 // 1
*
1111 xqqx 
*
1
*
21 / qq 
*
2dq 3/1/ 1 dx

)
4(
1x
18/25(1
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1 


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xRe       (12) 
Next, we derive the optimal -level in autarky.  In autarky, a firm does not choose its 
R&D strategically as it cannot influence its rival’s output through its R&D.  In contrast to 
the regimes with trade, there are no strategic terms and profit maximisation now simply 
implies:  
0
1
1
1
1 



xdx
d 
         (13) 
with  // 1111 xqx 
00
1x
.  So, the marginal production cost reduction chosen by firm 1 
in autarky (denoted by ) is given by: 
Ax




2
00
1           (14) 
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Using Figure 2, we now discuss the best response for firm 1 at all possible -values for 
given t.  Expression (8), , is firm 1’s best-response function only when there is 
two-way trade.  That is, it is relevant and therefore depicted in area 4 only.  More 
specifically, it only applies for 
2x
)( 21 xR
ee
222 xxx  .  At 22 xx  , firm 1 ceases to export to 
Foreign (i.e.,  for 0*1 q )( 21 xR
ee ); at this point )( 21 xR
ee coincides with the -locus.  
Hence, for 
0*1q
22 xx  , firm 1’s best response to  is  (given by expression (10) 
and relevant for area 2 in Figure 1).    The lower boundary for the two-way trade best 
response function  occurs at 
2x )( 2
0
1 xR
e
)2(1 xR
ee
22 xx  ; at that point, firm 2 ceases to export to 
Home (i.e.,  for 02 q )( 21 xR
ee ). 
 
Let us now turn to area 1 of Figure 1.  In area 1, neither firm is exporting ( ), 
and hence each firm chooses its R&D as a monopolist firm in autarky; in other words, 
firm 1’s optimal -level is given by  (expression (14)).  Firm 1 will choose the 
autarky -level as its best response to , for 
02
*
1  qq
1x
00
1x
2x1x 222 xxx  .  When  falls just below 2x
2
x , firm 1 starts exporting to Foreign, but firm 2 remains active only in its own domestic 
market (i.e.,  for 0*1q )( 2
0
1 xR
e ); at 
2
x , )(
2
0
1 xR
e  coincides with the -locus.  
Hence, for 
0*1 q
22
xx 
)
, firm 1’s best response to  is  (given by expression (12)). 
So,  is relevant in area 3 in Figure 2.  In Figure 2, at 
2x )( 2
0
1 xR
e
( 2x
0
1R
e
22 xx  , the upper boundary 
for firm 1 choosing the autarky -level as its best response to , firm 2’s exports to 
Home are just equal to zero (i.e., 
1x
2
2x
0q ). 
 
The range of -values for which we have not yet determined firm 1’s best response is  2x
222 xxx  .  Define 2
~x  as the -value at which the two non-negativity constraints 
( 0  and ) intersect.  First, consider -values in the sub-range 
2x
*
1 q 02q 2x 222
~xxx  .  
At  slightly above 2x 2x , firm 1’s best response can no longer be the autarky -level 
(given by expression (14)) since then firms would end up in area 2 in which firm 2’s 
1x
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exports are positive.  If firm 1 faces competition by firm 2 in Home but is not exporting, 
its best response is given by   (expression (10)).   However, the -level implied 
by  would be so large that it would violate the non-negativity constraint on firm 
2’s exports.  Hence, firm 1’s best response is constrained by  
)( 2
0
1 xR
e
1x
)( 2
0
1 xR
e
02 q  and it has to choose 
 so that this constraint is not violated (see expression (6a)).  The same reasoning holds 
for all -values in the sub-range 
1x
2x 222
~xxx  , hence firm 1’s (constrained) best 
response for this sub-range is given by 02 q .  Next, consider -values in the sub-
range 
2x
222
~ xx x  .  At  slightly below 2x 2x , firm 1’s best response can no longer be 
given by the  best response function since it would violate the non-negativity 
constraint on firm 2’s exports.  Hence, firm 1’s best response is constrained by  
)( 21 xR
ee
02 q  
and it has to choose  so that this constraint is not violated (see expression (6a)).  The 
same reasoning holds for all -values in the sub-range 
1x
2x 222
~ xx x  , hence firm 1’s 
(constrained) best response is here too given by 02 q  and is denoted by 022 )( qx1R . 
 
Table 1 summarises the best response function for firm 1.  Note that firm 2’s best 
response function is derived in an analogous way and is completely symmetric. 
 
3. Multilateral trade liberalisation 
As we will show in this section the firm’s best response function derived in section 2.2 is 
only valid for a certain range of trade costs.  In subsection 3.1, we derive the equilibria of 
the game for all possible trade cost levels.  This allows us to discuss how the equilibrium 
outcomes change as countries gradually and multilaterally liberalise trade, starting from 
autarky.  Trade liberalisation here implies that countries multilaterally reduce the non-
tariff barriers that exist between them.  Subsequently, in subsection 3.2, we discuss the 
impact of this multilateral trade liberalisation on innovation, profits, prices, consumer 
surplus and, ultimately, on overall welfare.  In subsection 3.3, we highlight the 
significance of strategic investment for our results. 
 
3.1. Equilibria 
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We distinguish between three ranges of trade cost, in each of which the possible 
equilibrium outcomes are qualitatively different.  In order to define these ranges, it 
proves useful to define some critical t -values.  Define t  as the critical t -threshold at and 
above which trade cannot occur in equilibrium. This is the prohibitive trade cost.  There 
is another level of trade cost, 
ˆ
t~ , which is defined as the critical t -threshold below which 
autarky cannot occur in equilibrium.  We will show that, unlike in the initial RM model, 
these two thresholds do not coincide. Instead in this model with strategic investment we 
have tt ˆ~0  .  
 
The innovation reaction functions in section 2 were derived for trade costs in the region 
ttt ˆ~ 
)( 12 xR
, that is, for the range of trade costs at which neither trade nor autarky are ruled 
out.  Hence, it proves convenient to discuss the equilibrium outcomes for this case first.  
Figure 3a depicts both firms’ innovation reaction functions (firm 2’s reaction function, 
, is depicted by the bold dashed kinked line) for ttt ˆ~  .  In this case, the 
reaction functions intersect three times, hence there are three equilibria.  The equilibrium 
at point O is stable and implies autarky; the autarky innovation level for each firm is 
given by expression (14).   The equilibrium at point E is also stable and involves two-way 
trade; the two-way trade equilibrium level of innovation for each firm is: 


)9/8(1
)2()9/4(



tA
xeei          (15) 
The equilibrium in the middle, at point U, is unstable; at U, each firm produces for its 
domestic market only and chooses its R&D to keep its rival’s exports equal to zero.  The 
implied -level is denoted by ix 0jqix   and is equal to: 
Atx
jqi


2
0
           (16) 
with  in this region. 2/At 
 
Suppose that trade costs decrease.  As t  falls, the non-negativity constraint on firm 1’s 
exports ( ) shifts to the left, while the non-negativity constraint on firm 2’s exports 
( ) shifts down.  As a result, area 1 in Figure 1 contracts, whereas area 4 expands. 
0*1 q
02 q
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We now examine what happens when  falls below t t~ .  The autarky equilibrium has 
vanished in this case and, with it, has the unstable equilibrium.  Figure 3b shows an 
example of what the innovation reaction functions will look like when trade costs fall 
below t~ .  They only intersect once (point E); only the two-way trade equilibrium 
remains. 
 
In the case in which  , area 1 in Figure 1 has expanded at the expense of area 4.  In 
fact, the two-way trade equilibrium has disappeared now (and, again, so has the unstable 
equilibrium) and only the autarky equilibrium survives.  This case is depicted in Figure 
3c; the reaction functions intersect only once (point O); now the unique equilibrium is 
autarky. 
tt ˆ
 
Let us now consider a process of gradual multilateral trade liberalisation, in which 
countries start with trade costs above t  and eventually end up with free trade.  As they 
first liberalise trade and as  falls below  but remains above 
ˆ
t t̂ t~ , countries will either 
remain in autarky, or start to engage in two-way trade.  Only when trade liberalisation is 
sufficiently drastic, i.e., implying a fall in trade costs such that t  falls below t~ , will two-
way trade be guaranteed.  In short, the path of trade liberalisation is not unique.  While a 
limited degree of trade liberalisation may be sufficient to generate trade between the 
countries involved, it does not guarantee it.  Instead, the integrating countries may be 
“trapped” in autarky until a more radical degree of trade liberalisation is attained. 
 
The precise path of trade liberalisation that is followed will have implications for 
countries’ welfare levels.  These will be discussed in the next subsection. 
 
3.2. Innovation, prices, profits and welfare 
We will now look at the effect of multilateral trade liberalisation on innovation, profits, 
consumer surplus and welfare. As we have seen above, given our assumption that the 
countries are symmetric and the multilateral trade liberalisation takes a symmetric form, 
the equilibria themselves are always symmetric. We can therefore focus on the effects of 
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trade liberalisation on the home country as the effects on the foreign country are 
identical.  
 
The level of innovation is captured by the cost reduction, .  Figure 4 depicts innovation 
as a function of trade costs.  As is clear from expression (15), the cost reduction is linear 
in the trade cost when the firm is trading, with lower t leading to more innovation.  Since 
the cost reduction, , is monotonically increasing in the level of R&D spending, , 
this too increases when trade costs fall. Furthermore, there is a discrete upward jump in 
the degree of innovation (cost-reduction) when we move from the autarky to the trading 
equilibrium. This is due to the fact that R&D is chosen more aggressively when firms 
face foreign rivals than when they are not trading. 
ix
ee
ix
ee
ik
 
Firms’ profits are U-shaped in the trade cost and are higher in autarky than under 
completely free trade. In the neighbourhood of free trade the trade cost works like a tax 
reducing the firms’ profits. However, when trade costs are nearly prohibitive, they, 
although reducing profits on export sales, serve to protect the now relatively much more 
important own market profits from import competition. Hence, in this region profits 
increase in trade costs. As can be seen in Figure 5, which represents how trade costs 
affect firm profits, there is a discrete fall in profits when firms start to trade even when 
the level of trade is infinitesimally small. This is due to the more aggressive way in which 
R&D is chosen when firms face competition. Compared to monopolist firms under 
autarky, trading firms set higher total outputs given the level of R&D and they choose 
their investment more aggressively.  From the point of view of the firms, trade is a 
prisoner’s dilemma outcome. 
 
To see how trade affects consumers, consider how it affects consumer surplus. Consumer 
surplus in the Home country is given by: .  Figure 6 depicts how trade costs 
affect consumer surplus.  Consumption of the imperfectly competitive good increases for 
two reasons as trade is liberalised. Firstly, total output increases at given R&D levels due 
to the fall in the level of the trade costs.  Secondly, the increase in R&D resulting from 
2/2QCS 
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trade liberalisation leads to a further increase in output. The net result is that trade 
liberalisation reduces the price of imperfectly competitive good and raises consumer 
surplus. Note that the price is always lower and the consumers are better off under trade, 
no matter how restricted it is, than they are under autarky. 
 
In our model, welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and profit. For the home country, 
this is given by:  
1 CSW           (17) 
Welfare is higher under free trade than autarky but it inherits the property of being U- 
shaped from the profit function.  As a result, small reductions in trade costs from a high 
level can lead to a fall in welfare. If  , the effectiveness  of R&D is low, welfare under 
restricted trade can fall below the level under autarky.  This is illustrated in Figure 7a.  
However, there exists a level of   high enough such that trade no matter how limited 
yields higher welfare than autarky.  This case is depicted in Figure 7b. 
 
3.3. The role of strategic investment 
In our model the firms commit to their R&D level in stage one and then choose outputs in 
the second stage.  Hence, the R&D is chosen strategically to affect rival outputs. To see 
how important this feature of the model is for the welfare benefits of trade liberalisation, 
consider a hypothetical alternative in which R&D and outputs are chosen simultaneously. 
We will refer to this as the non-strategic benchmark.  In that case the firms cannot use 
their investments to manipulate rivals strategically.  Also, in that case the trade cost 
thresholds, t~  and t  coincide. This means that there is no region with multiple equilibria.  
Above 
ˆ
tt ~ˆ  , autarky is the unique equilibrium, whereas below tt ~ˆ   the trading 
equilibrium is unique.   
 
In the non-strategic benchmark case, there is no discrete upward jump in the level of 
innovation when firms move from the autarky to the trade equilibrium (as there is in 
Figure 4).  The reason for this lies in the fact that trading firms do not behave differently 
when choosing innovation levels than when they are monopolists in autarky. Whether 
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trading or producing in autarky, innovation only affects firm profits directly, i.e., through 
the investing firm’s costs.  Hence, firms choose innovation levels that minimises costs.  
In this case, a small reduction in trade costs from the prohibitive level always results in 
welfare falling below the autarky level, irrespective of the effectiveness of R&D ( ).  
This hypothetical benchmark is represented in Figure 8.  In our model of strategic 
investment, firms also choose their innovation levels to minimise costs under autarky.  
However, when they compete with their rival in the trading equilibrium, innovation also 
affects firm profits indirectly, i.e., firms will choose their investment trying to manipulate 
rival output.  It is precisely the fact that firms choose R&D strategically and hence above 
the level that minimises costs that allows the possibility that the trading equilibrium 
guarantees higher welfare than autarky.  Strategic investment in the trading equilibrium, 
combined with a sufficiently high degree of R&D effectiveness, will in fact ensure that 
trade is welfare superior to autarky throughout the whole process of trade liberalisation.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we have developed a reciprocal markets model with strategic R&D to 
examine how trade liberalisation affects innovation, profits and welfare. We found that 
there exists a range of trade costs at which there are two stable equilibria. At one of these 
equilibria, firms do not export, while there is intra-industry trade at the other. When trade 
is liberalised further, only the equilibrium with trade continues to exist. 
 
Compared to the autarky equilibrium, the trading equilibrium involves higher R&D 
spending and innovation.  Both profits and welfare are U-shaped in the trade cost.  Thus, 
a small reduction in trade cost can raise profits at low trade costs, even though it causes 
profits to fall at high trade costs. Similarly, there is a range of trade costs over which a 
fall in trade costs can lower welfare. Importantly, however, if the effectiveness of 
investment is sufficiently high, trade yields higher welfare than autarky at any level of 
non-prohibitive trade costs. 
 
Clearly, our model can be extended or modified along a number of lines to address 
related questions in the trade-IO literature. Although we have focused on symmetric 
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multilateral liberalisation, it is straightforward to use our framework to examine 
asymmetric and unilateral liberalisations.  Another natural extension would be to allow 
for R&D-spillovers and for international R&D joint ventures.  In addition, there is a 
number of other extensions in which we could allow for more firms and more goods. For 
instance, it is possible to merge our framework with one in which there is an endogenous 
number of firms and one with multi-product firms. 
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Figure 2: Firm 1’s reaction function in (x1,x2)-space
2x
2x
2x
2
x
2
~x
)( 21 xR
ee
00
1x
)( 2
0
1 xR
e
)( 2
0
1 xR
e
021 2
)(
q
xR
1x
2x
02 q
0*1 q
Figure 3a: Equilibria for trade costs                  
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Figure 3b: Equilibria for trade costs            
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Figure 4: Innovation and trade liberalisation
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Figure 5: Profits and trade liberalisation
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Figure 6: Consumer surplus and trade liberalisation
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Figure 7a: Welfare when the effectiveness of R&D () is low
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Figure 7b: Welfare when the effectiveness of R&D () is high
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Figure 8: Welfare in the non-strategic benchmark
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Table 1: Firm 1’s best R&D response function 
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